Loading...

Tag: Security

EU-Ukraine relations: a window of opportunity

  • June 2019
  • Hannah Bettsworth

EU-Ukraine relations: a window of opportunity

Unlike for the cast of HBO’s Chernobyl, there is hope for EU and Ukrainian policymakers yet.

Ukrainian flag

Source: Pixabay

 

 

 

HBO’s bleak, bureaucratic miniseries Chernobyl has put Ukraine at the top of the cultural agenda. As Ukraine and the EU move into a new stage of their relationship, policymakers on both sides may well empathise with the series’ characters who cooperate to overcome inertia.

 

Indeed, EU-Ukrainian cooperation has been marked by division in recent times. In the economic sphere, European farmers have turned their ire on a Ukrainian chicken breast exporter exploiting a loophole in the EU-Ukraine trade deal. Out of the EU’s desire to preserve a key tool of Ukraine’s European alignment, the resulting agreement largely benefited Ukraine. Members of the European Parliament may provide serious resistance in passing the deal.

Recent elections both in Ukraine and in the EU have given both sides an impetus to reboot their efforts. Although concerns have been raised about newly elected President Zelensky’s populism, it is not the same kind of populism we see in the European Union. Zelensky, for one, is not a pro-Kremlin figure. Putin’s understanding of that fact underlined his offer of Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens in the Donbas region. A pro-EU and pro-NATO Russophone politician undermines Russia’s narrative that Ukrainian Russophones are loyal to Russia.

 

Zelensky’s political party is ahead in the polls by a substantial margin, before the Parliamentary election in Ukraine scheduled for 21 July. He can expect to have a strong parliamentary majority for reform ahead of the new European Commission coming into office. On the EU’s part, the feared populist revolution failed to materialise. Russia would have enjoyed the emergence of a populist bloc in the European Parliament, large enough to hamstring the EU’s action. In its absence, Ukraine and the EU are free to continue deepening their relationship.

 

This will not be an easy journey. The EU last assessed the implementation of the Association Agreement in November 2018. It noted that progress was being made, particularly in public services – pensions, healthcare and education. Energy is a key area of focus for both sides. Indeed, the Ukrainian Parliament recently ratified amendments to the Association Agreement, laying the groundwork for Ukraine’s integration into the European energy market. The spectre of Nord Stream 2 hangs over these discussions. It has been referred to as ‘Ukraine’s worst nightmare’, and sends conflicting messages about European commitment to energy security and Ukrainian economic development.

 

In addition, reform itself is a difficult path to tread. Challenges persist in anti-corruption measures, economic stabilisation, and the continued conflict and destabilisation efforts by Russia.

 

The Ukrainian public (excluding the Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), according to February 2019 polling from the Razumkov Centre, has a negative attitude to the ongoing series of reforms: land, healthcare, pensions, education, judicial reforms, as well as the mass privatisation of state-owned enterprises. The poll also highlighted brain drain from Ukraine as a threat, calling for discussions on partial reimbursement for education spending on emigrants.

 

However, unlike for Chernobyl‘s cast, there is hope for EU and Ukrainian policymakers yet. Global Skills Partnerships are gaining traction in European policy circles to share the benefits of migration between destination and origin countries. For example: two Ukrainians would train at home. One would choose to stay and the other to migrate to the EU. An EU organisation in need of their skills would pay for the migrating student’s training in full, and also pay for half of the remaining student’s. The migrant worker would then commit to work for that organisation for a period of time and pay off the training costs with a fraction of their salary. Both countries gain highly-skilled employees, while their governments do not bear any of the cost – helping to tackle the ‘brain drain’ problem.

Although Ukrainians may have a negative perception of Association Agreement reforms, they remain positive about the European path as a whole. Data from the International Republican Institute, Sociological Group Rating and GfK demonstrate this. When Ukrainians[1] were asked to choose between joining the EU or a Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, support for the EU fluctuated between 30 and 40% from November 2011 to February 2014. In March 2014, support for joining the EU shot up to 52% and has had majority backing ever since. Support for the Customs Union has become a minority opinion. The presidential elections have not changed this – support for joining the EU was 57% in May 2019. NATO accession has also gained some popularity after Russian military action on Ukrainian territory began. In May 2019, 49% of Ukrainians stated they would support joining NATO in a referendum.

Support for joining the EU finds majority backing among supporters of all Ukrainian political parties with the potential to win parliamentary seats, bar the pro-Russia Opposition Platform. The picture is similar for NATO. It wins majority support across most party supporters, a plurality among Zelensky’s party supporters, and strong opposition from the Opposition Platform. Although it will not be a straightforward journey, it is one that voters in Ukraine across the political spectrum remain committed to.

 

Overall, the convergence of Ukrainian and EU electoral cycles provides a window of opportunity for both sides to recommit to their cooperation. On the Ukrainian side, the government must use this impetus to continue with structural reform and anti-corruption measures while working with the EU to alleviate citizen concerns. The EU should remain a strong backer of Ukraine’s European pathway and resist the temptation of rapprochement with Russia.

[1] Figures from after April 2014 exclude Crimea. Figures from after September 2014 exclude occupied Donbas.

Share on social media:

Looking for a common strategy

  • March 2019
  • Otto Ilveskero

Looking for a common strategy

 

EU struggles with a united vision on China ahead of bilateral summit

 

Source: Wikimedia Commons

 

The EU is struggling to maintain a united front towards China ahead of the 21st bilateral EU–China summit on 9 April. After the Commission labelled China a “systemic rival” for the first time, France has stepped up the calls for a common EU strategy and an alignment of vision towards China.

 

But while President Macron staged a “mini-summit” with Angela Merkel, Jean-Claude Juncker to Paris and China’s Xi Jinping on Tuesday (26 April), the Italian government was busy signing a bilateral investment deal as a part of the global power’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The EU’s slow departure from its usual soft stance towards Beijing is a welcomed step despite having so far gained limited attention beyond the Franco-German axis. Alongside Italy, 12 other EU members have signed a memorandum of understanding with China on BRI.

 

China’s growing interest in Europe comes with risks attached

 

Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Europe has risen rapidly over the past decade. Last year Chinese companies completed FDI transactions worth over eight times the 2010 numbers (from €2.1 billion to €17.3 billion). During the record year of 2016, Chinese firms completed investments worth €37.2 billion in the EU. This year, China’s trade conflict with the United States has already prompted growing Chinese interests towards Europe, as highlighted by Xi’s European tour. China’s recent €2.5 billion memorandum of understanding with Italy, which marks the first time a G7 economy has signed up to the BRI, could grow to €20 billion in value in the future. These investments to the struggling Italian economy cover ports, satellites, agriculture, and media, among other sectors. In addition, China has also set aside a provisional €15 billion in the train tunnel development plan between Helsinki and Tallinn earlier this year. Chinese technology company Huawei’s investments and sponsorships in Europe worth billions of euros are also well-documented.

 

But dealing with state-owned companies that use Chinese governmental subsidies to their advantage will inevitably come with potential risk factors. Estonia’s Prime Minister Jüri Ratas, for instance, has called for a security review of the FinEst Bay Area project. Moreover, during his recent visit to Central Europe and Brussels, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo sounded alarm on EU member states conducting business with Huawei on the company’s 5G technology in particular, which the US administration has identified as a security risk. Washington has suspected the Chinese government could use Huawei technology for spying, although it has so far not provided public evidence to support the claim. Like Germany earlier this month, the European Commission resisted the calls to issue a blanket ban on Huawei in its new Cybersecurity Recommendation published on Tuesday 26 March. Instead, the European agenda-setter decided to ask the national capitals to run risk assessments on 5G network technology and to collaborate on common EU-wide measures before auctioning spectrum bands. Many member states – notably France, Italy, and the UK, are yet to update their 5G security requirements.

 

China’s ‘debtbook diplomacy’ and strategic investments in Europe

 

China’s strategic investments around Europe may in the long-term constitute an unsustainable burden on weaker European economies. This so-called ‘debtbook diplomacy’ allows China to use economic leverage to politically coerce vulnerable countries to achieve its strategic aims. For example, the EU has raised concerns over China’s investments in Central and Eastern Europe as a part of its 16+1 Initiative. Similarly, due to concerns over the autonomy and sovereignty of Italy, the EU’s budget commissioner Günther Oettinger recently called for the EU to veto the member state’s participation in Chinese infrastructure projects. “[I]nfrastructure of strategic importance like power networks, rapid rail lines or harbours are no longer in European but in Chinese hands”, the commissioner added.

 

Equally important to China are the strategic investments made over the past decade which have led to its state-owned enterprises controlling around 10% of European cargo port capacity – most recently signing deals to manage Italy’s largest port in Genoa as well as the port of Trieste. On a continent where 70% of all goods crossing its borders travel by sea, this is certainly not insignificant. In addition, as a result of its carefully planned ‘science diplomacy’ and investments through the ‘Polar Silk Road’, China has been able to carve a foothold in strategically valuable locations in the Arctic. This has provided China with the opportunity to better observe air traffic and monitor naval activity in Europe’s High North, as well as tighten its grip on the global rare earth materials market. There is always a possibility these acquisitions will be used for non-civilian purposes later on.

 

EU needs a coherent common China strategy

 

The EU is in need of an updated common China strategy. (This applies equally to NATO, as pointed out here by Carnegie Endowment’s Erik Brattberg.) Although the nature of rhetoric has shifted since the EU’s 2016 Elements for a new EU strategy on China, the continent remains divided on its attitudes towards Beijing. For example, the southern member states have been critical of Brussels and the northern member states’ complaints about the scale of Chinese investment, given that many of them were pushed to sell prime asset during the height of the eurozone crisis. The combined impact of slow economic growth and the EU’s failure to maintain economic solidarity has also resulted in a situation where member states such as Italy are considering selling debt to China. This has understandably raised concerns in Brussels regarding the possibility for China to establish political leverage over Rome.

 

Calling for China to deliver on World Trade Organization (WTO) reforms regarding subsidies and technology transfers is not enough, when the EU cannot do it as one voice. Effective implementation of common screening regulation for FDI is one thing, but the EU must also improve its own practices on strategic investment to support many areas that now feel the need to turn to China due to lack of investment. Increasing EU investment on infrastructure and industry is important also from the perspective of sustainable development.

 

This is, however, not to say that the EU should become adversarial towards China or ban Chinese investments as a security risk altogether. It is to support what the Commission has already stated: ‘Neither the EU nor any of its Member States can effectively achieve their aims with China without full unity.’ It is highly important that member states ensure their bilateral relations with China comply with EU law and policies, while the EU aims to deliver a more balanced and reciprocal overall trade relationship with Beijing. A united EU can expect to wield some leverage in trade negotiations as China’s largest trading partner, but this should not be overestimated. China is adept at pitting Europeans against each other (not to say Europeans would not be good at it on their own). Thus, without a common strategy, the EU simply cannot push for the reciprocity in economic ties and advances in human rights it so desires.

Share on social media:

Can’t trust this

  • March 2019
  • Otto Ilveskero

Can’t trust this

 

Common European action needed to challenge disinformation

 

Source: Pixabay

 

With under 80 days to go until the European Elections, disinformation and the integrity of electoral democracy seems to be on everyone’s lips. This week saw the Washington DC -based Atlantic Council bring its #DisinfoWeek conference to Brussels, while the Martens Centre and Antall József Knowledge Centre co-hosted an event on information security in Europe. On top of this, the European Commission is currently gearing up to its 2019 Media Literacy Week later this month, attempting to raise awareness and promote existing national initiatives before the elections in May. The problem has been identified and clearly documented, but how to respond to the challenge posed by malevolent disinformation campaigns remains an issue.

 

The Commission defines disinformation as ‘verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may cause public harm’. Whether disinformation can be disseminated purely for political gain is left unanswered by the Commission. Currently, the EU’s proposed Action Plan against Disinformation consists of four sectors: strengthening information security capabilities, coordinating joint responses, mobilising private sector actors, and improving media literacy.

 

The unprecedented speed with which modern (dis-)information spreads creates a need for governments, civil society organisations, and companies to collaborate in an effort to improve the public’s resilience in the face of disinformation campaigns. In addition, the cross-border nature of digital information platforms also calls for a common European approach to this challenge, even though the organisation and protection of elections remain national competencies within the EU. And a response is certainly needed: according to a Eurobarometer survey published in March 2018, 83% of Europeans think that “fake news” are a threat to democracy. Therefore, it is crucial for the EU to strengthen its cybersecurity capacities and enable the sharing of best practice between member state authorities to respond to disinformation campaigns.

 

It is important, however, to understand that much of disinformation is not simply false information from shady sources as much as intentional misrepresentations of information from credible sources, as explained by Chloe Colliver from the Institute for Strategic Dialogues at the #DisinfoWeek Brussels 2019. The issue is highly complex, as often the information being shared may not be purposefully false but merely information framed to fit a specific problematic narrative. And to make matters more complicated, those who share this information are mostly domestic actors, ordinary citizens, rather than extremists seeking to cause societal harm. Thus, the questions over who and what to regulate become increasingly more difficult the better we understand the disinformation sphere.

 

Furthermore, not all disinformation is equally harmful or disruptive. Whereas some conspiracy theories (e.g. flat earth theorists) are harmless to the world around them, many other disinformation campaigns carry the potential to incite violence (e.g. malevolent anti-refugee narratives) or serious risks to public safety (e.g. anti-vaccination campaigns). Keeping this in mind, regulators can sidestep much of the accusations regarding silencing the freedom of speech (which is not being advocated here – curbing liberal values and the diversity inherent in democratic debate is what the malicious actors fuelling disinformation campaigns want) by regulating not offensive content, but content that is harmful to the safety and well-being of others.

 

Then we have the aims to improve media literacy and fact-checking systems. Often posited as alternatives to regulating social media platforms, the former can unfairly place an overwhelming majority of the responsibility on individuals in an increasingly complicated field, while the latter can be almost invisible in the world of social media algorithms that favour sensationalism and echo chambers. Fact-checking is not a viable option, when those within our digital communities reinforce opinions originally based on disinformation. Simply put, facts don’t change our minds. Media literacy, on the other hand, is absolutely crucial and must be robustly introduced in school curriculums across Europe. At the same time, however, improving media literacy is a long-term, expensive solution and requires the input of government regulation, NGO campaigns, and company responsibility to accompany its growing effect.

 

We cannot expect that a strengthened communication effort less than three months before the European Elections will adequately safeguard the quality of public debate and integrity of the electoral process, when the seeds of the trust-corroding anti-EU message have consistently been sowed over years. Raising awareness through fact-checking and media literacy through education are long-term projects which we must focus on constantly, rather than periodically in times of election campaigns. The current election-to-election focus risks losing sight of the long-term dangers posed by disinformation and can inhibit us from making the necessary, sustainable action plans.

 

All in all, the issue of disinformation is here to stay and requires long-term efforts to be adequately challenged. Elections provide a fruitful ground for fake news and intentionally misinterpreted content to flourish, but to most effectively tackle the dangers of disinformation, the EU must commit to improving public debate and safeguarding democracy also outside of the campaign season.

Share on social media:

Europe’s High North

  • March 2019
  • Otto Ilveskero

Europe’s High North

 

The EU must update its strategy as global interest in the Arctic region grows

 

Source: Wikimedia Commons

 

As Western Europe basks in the sun with the temperatures reaching unprecedented levels in February, it is good to remember that this just is not normal. Last four years have been the warmest ever recorded in global average temperatures. In fact, the 20 warmest years on record have all occurred over the past 22 years according to the UN-affiliated World Meteorological Organization. Global warming has had a particularly devastating effect on the Arctic, which has lost 95% of its oldest ice cover, and destabilised the northern polar jet stream. In turn, a weaker, wavier jet stream allows warmer air to move unusually north in some regions and colder air to travel further south in others, which has been linked with both the recent heatwave in Western Europe and polar vortex in Canada and Midwestern United States.

 

At this rate, summers in the Arctic could be ice-free by 2040. The polar region is warming twice as quickly as the rest of the globe and this will have significant implications for the environment, global ecosystems, and lives of the around 4 million people who live in the area. Receding ice will also open up sea routes for commercial opportunities and military use. As a result, the geopolitical status and strategic importance of the Arctic will only grow in the near future, demanding answers to critical questions about security and diplomacy. With three Arctic states as its members (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) and seven other member states having been granted observer status in the Arctic Council, the EU has a significant interest in the stability of the region.

 

The EU’s Arctic policy lacks a security angle

 

The EU’s policy in the High North has so far mainly focused on matters such as environmental concerns, scientific research, and the regulation of fisheries. A premium is also put on regional and local cooperation with the Arctic states and indigenous peoples. For an aspiring global leader in climate action and a strong defender of multilateral regulatory frameworks, this emphasis is of course hardly surprising. A fit for purpose European Arctic strategy, however, needs to be more comprehensive in scope and take into account the growing global interest in the region, which is not purely scientific or environmental.

 

Security matters were actually omitted altogether from the EU’s latest Arctic policy update, released in 2016. This was the case despite an earlier 2008 document taking into account territorial disputes in the region regarding Russia, for example. To be fair, the EU’s Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy does include the Arctic as one of the strategic regions, but even then that specific section is only one paragraph in length. ‘The EU has a strategic interest in the Arctic remaining a low-tension area’, it says, before repeating the key tenets of the aforementioned 2016 policy emphasising the need to tackle climate change and support innovation in the region. The Council, however, highlighted on its June 2016 Conclusions that ‘reinforcing the EU’s engagement in the Arctic’ is an important factor of its foreign and security policy and called for an ‘ambitious cross-spectrum and well-coordinated’ strategy to engage with regional and global actors in the area.

 

To achieve the EU’s objective of maintaining low tensions, all efforts to avoid a “scramble for the Arctic” are absolutely integral. The melting region is expected to compose the largest unexplored area of oil and natural gas remaining in the world, which is certainly of interest to many global players. Estimated 90 billion barrels of oil and 47,2 trillion cubic metres of natural gas resources remain buried under the seabed, according to the U.S. Geographical Survey. In addition to the resource question, control over shipping lanes will be another hot topic. For instance, the Northern Sea Route would cut the time it takes to ship goods from St Petersburg to Vladivostok by 14 days. Similarly, it would shorten the journey cargo ships carrying goods between China and Europe currently take through the Suez Canal by up to 40%. As such, overlapping territorial claims, military assertiveness, and infrastructure investment (with ulterior motives) from Arctic and non-Arctic states alike have increased accordingly and will continue to do so in the future.

 

Russian & China: The growing influence of assertive powers

 

The fears of escalating competition for the Arctic were greatly fuelled already back in August 2007, when Russian explorers (with the help of a nuclear-powered icebreaker and two submarines) placed a Russian flag on the seabed below the North Pole. The stunt gained even more attention when Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov connected it with his country’s ambition to claim nearly half of the Arctic Ocean. The only non-NATO state with a coastline on the Arctic Ocean had previously submitted this claim in 2001 under the procedures set by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – only for the demands to be rejected due to lack of geological evidence. More recently, emboldened Russia has asserted itself in the region with constant military drills, reopened bases, and strengthened air defence as per the Kremlin’s 2008 arctic strategy and 2017 naval doctrine. Anticipating competition from China, Japan, and the Arctic NATO states, Russia seems set to militarising the Arctic. Russia’s dwindling economy is, however, going to have an impact on its grand ambitions.

 

The Arctic is also at the centre of China’s poetically named Polar Silk Road, which forms a part of the multi-billion-dollar Belt and Way Initiative. Lacking military capacity to effectively project power in the Arctic, China relies on carefully planned ‘science diplomacy’ and investments on strategic infrastructure to gain a foothold in the north. This has already resulted in China gaining observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013 and rapidly growing its mining rights in Greenland, for example. The former exemplifies China’s increasing willingness to assert its presence in global governance through a vast variety of multilateral fora, while the latter has tightened China’s grip of the global rare earth materials market, allowing the country to exert price control. Moreover, investment in ports on the Arctic Ocean provides China with the possibility to monitor naval activity, while Chinese-owned airports in the Arctic could allow the owners to observe air traffic. Thus, the EU must keep in mind the real possibility of China using its infrastructure, mining, and space observation investments for non-civilian purposes.

 

The EU must reassess its role in the northern neighbourhood

 

The West as a whole has been poorly prepared for the growing geopolitical importance of the Arctic. NATO, for instance, has consistently failed to include the region in its Strategic Concept and North Atlantic discussions in a meaningful way (even though both Denmark and Norway’s national Arctic policies do mention NATO’s presence as a security factor). The defence alliance did, however, conduct its largest Arctic drill in decades last October, so perhaps the focus is slowly shifting at last. Meanwhile, the EU’s climate action focus has also lost an ally in the West. Reversing President Obama’s 2016 Arctic offshore drilling ban, the Trump administration has foolishly hopped on board the environmentally catastrophic Arctic energy extraction rush by selling 19 Alaskan offshore sites between this year and 2024. This shift places even larger importance on the EU’s efforts on raising climate awareness and supporting Arctic communities.

 

The EU needs to reassess its own role in the Arctic. The EU does not have a coastline in the Arctic and will not be a leading force in the region, but it can still have an impact in the way security concerns are addressed and diplomacy is conducted regarding the area. Thus, the bloc must attempt to participate more actively in the meetings of the Barents Regional Council and the Arctic Council, as well as encourage dialogue through the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and the Northern Chiefs of Defence forum, in order to establish stronger ties with the main actors in the region. Europe must also better recognise the risks posed by overlapping territorial claims and support the UNCLOS procedures to impartially evaluate each competing demand. In addition, given the advantage of Chinese government-subsidised companies in acquiring strategic assets within the EU and the EEA, the Commission’s investment plans should be more visible and provide better support to infrastructure and research projects in Lapland, Iceland, and Greenland to ensure sustainable development.

 

So far, the EU’s efforts have been crucial in promoting sustainability and supporting science in the Arctic, but in order to raise Europe’s profile in the High North, the EU must take the growing global interest and strategic importance of the region more visibly into account in its strategy.

Share on social media:
Next >>
Close
loading...