In contrast to its Croatian neighbor, which smoothly joined the European Union in 2013 and adopted the euro last January, Bosnia has faced a lengthy and intricate journey toward EU membership, spanning over two decades. Numerous factors contribute to the challenging relationship between Bosnia and the European Union, ranging from internal ethnic divisions to the intricacies of the political system and Republika Srpska’s secessionist aspirations. In December 2022, despite this increasingly complicated internal context, the country nevertheless received the status of candidate country for the European Union from the Council, 6 years after submitting its application. This situation seems paradoxical, given that as recently as 2019, the Commission was emphasizing the nation’s ‘significant political, institutional, and economic deficiencies,’ with the country grappling with one of its most severe political crises since the Dayton Accords of 1995. While the enlargement process was historically marked by a slow acceptance of new members and limited progress in candidate countries’ implementation of necessary reforms before 2022, it now seems to be gaining speed. But why this change of approach by the European Union? What is the current status of Bosnia’s integration process, and, more importantly, why does this small Western Balkan country appear to be on the sidelines?
Two Decades of Bosnia-EU Relations: a Long and Slow Journey
Bosnia and Herzegovina, a small country in the Western Balkans with a population of around 3.5 million, was identified as a ‘potential candidate’ for European Union membership as early as 2003, exactly 20 years ago. However, it took 13 years for its application to be officially submitted in 2016, marking the start of a “long journey“, according to Johannes Hahn, then European Commissioner for Enlargement.
Before that, in 2008, Bosnia-Herzegovina concluded a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union, which became effective on June 1, 2015, as a specific bilateral agreement between the EU and this potential candidate country. It laid the foundations for a closer relationship in the future and for specific reforms in the country. In 2010, citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina also gained the right to travel to the Schengen area without a visa. It should also be noted that the country had already been part of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) since June 1999, an agreement between the EU and the Balkan region that provides a general framework for relations between the EU and the region, aiming to promote stabilization, democracy, rule of law, and economic reform in the countries. In short, it’s been a 20-year relationship evolving very, very slowly.
A relationship, yes, but a complex one between Bosnia and the European Union. In 2019, 3 years after obtaining candidate country status, both the Commission and the Council were highlighting the country’s weaknesses, with the Council even stating that BiH did not have a ‘sufficient level of political progress in any of the areas concerned’. So what has changed in the 3 years for Bosnia to obtain candidate country status in December 2022?
The change is not so much on Bosnia’s side, but rather on the side of the EU institutions. The impact of the war in Ukraine on the countries of the Western Balkans was marked by a change in EU policy in favor of the enlargement process for these countries. This change in policy strengthened the EU’s influence over the domestic politics of Western Balkan countries, and counterbalances Russia’s influence in the region. A change of political direction marked by two important political interventions during this political rentrée. First in Slovenia, at the Bled Strategic Forum, European Council President Charles Michel announced that the war in Ukraine had serious consequences for the future of our continent and that the EU “needs to reinforce (our) bonds and become more powerful (…) that’s why it is now time to tackle the challenge of enlargement. Both for us in the EU and for our future member states (…) yes, I believe this is how we should now call the countries with confirmed EU perspective, future member states“. In his speech, Charles Michel assured that the countries of the Western Balkans and the other candidate countries, as well as the EU itself, should be ready for enlargement by 2030 because “enlargement is no longer a dream. It is time to move forward”. This statement was made just a few days before the famous State of the Union speech given by Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, who also reiterated her commitment to enlargement: “In a world where size and weight matters, it is clearly in Europe’s strategic and security interests to complete our Union.“
Understanding the Integration Process: beyond the Copenhagen Criteria
A step towards enlargement, then, but what are the practicalities of joining the EU?
The European enlargement process is very strict and meets the requirements of Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union. Obviously, an application does not mean membership, and the process can take years or even never be completed. The rules to be followed are mainly the criteria laid down at the Copenhagen Council in 1993, more generally known as the “Copenhagen criteria.”
According to the Copenhagen criteria, a country can join the EU if it meets the required political, economic, and Community acquis conditions. Politically, this means “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities“. The European Commission considers democracy to be a European value, a norm of European society. On the economic front, the criteria include the establishment of a functioning market economy, meaning the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU, the adoption of economic policies which conform to EU standards, and, thus, the implementation of tools to control public finances. For the last criterion of the Community acquis, the country must implement the obligations imposed on EU members and adopt a policy “in line” with the Union’s political, economic, and monetary objectives. States seeking to join the Union must adapt their legislation in areas such as the single market, the environment, or human rights, for example. These Copenhagen criteria form the basis of the 14 priorities formulated by the Commission in 2019, criteria adapted to the Bosnian context.
But in the case of Bosnia, the general Copenhagen criteria are not the only criteria to be taken into account. Bosnia must also ensure that it applies the requirements of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), which this time are more specific. As explained earlier, the SAA is a bilateral agreement between the EU and a number of countries in the Western Balkans and other countries neighboring the EU. The SAA generally goes beyond the Copenhagen criteria by requiring the countries that signed it to undertake specific reforms tailored for the country to bring them closer to EU standards in a number of areas, including legislative harmonization, protection of human rights, the fight against corruption, etc. In other words, the SAA is an instrument that helps partner countries to comply with EU standards.
In summary, for Bosnia and Herzegovina to advance toward EU membership, it must fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, the overarching prerequisites for EU accession, while also meeting the specific demands outlined in its SAA with the EU. This implies far-reaching reforms and alignment with EU standards and values in many political, economic, and social areas. Fulfillment of these criteria and requirements is essential for progress in the EU accession process.
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Striving for Integration among Political Instability
“What has BiH done wrong? According to the academic literature on institutions, everything!” (Šiljak and Nielsen, 2022).
According to Šiljak and Nielsen, “BiH is a textbook example of a weak state with inefficient, extractive institutions.” BiH clearly has characteristics that have complicated the EU accession process. The fact that it took 13 years for Bosnia to go from being a potential candidate to actually applying for membership is essentially due to the political disputes between the Serb, Croat, and Muslim communities, which limited the scope for national reform. Indeed, the Bosnian political system has been complex and dysfunctional since the 1995 Dayton agreement, and faces many challenges: corruption, lack of rule of law, ethnic division between Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs, slow pace of reform, a weak economy, and social challenges. Bosnia is an imperfect, complicated, and stagnant democracy, which today “does not meet even the minimum definition of democracy by EU standards” (Šiljak and Nielsen, 2022).
But how can these weaknesses be explained? And how can they be addressed? According to Šiljak and Nielsen, BiH is a typical example of a weak state with ineffective institutions, where power is limited to a small ruling elite, systematically excluding other segments of society. BiH is a highly decentralized federal state made up of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS), each of which enjoys a high degree of autonomy, while state institutions remain relatively weak. Not counting the special case of the Brčko district, the FBiH is made up of ten cantons, each with its own government structures and significant autonomy. This has led to a complex political system with a large number of leaders, governments, and parliaments, making BiH one of the most over-administered countries in Europe. However, despite this complexity, the country suffers from chronic political instability, which is reflected in the World Bank’s political stability index. BiH also faces problems of democracy, governance, and corruption, which has led to the country being classified as a ‘hybrid regime’ by the EIU’s Democracy Index. In addition, institutions in ethnically divided countries tend not to be supportive of economic growth. Political fragmentation with numerous parties has also led to increased political instability. In its communication in December 2022, the European Council emphasized the importance for Bosnia-Herzegovina of taking measures to strengthen the rule of law, combat corruption and organized crime, manage migration, and ensure fundamental rights. The Council also stressed the urgent need for the country to make progress toward EU membership, particularly by responding to the 14 priorities set out by the European Commission in May 2019, which focus on the areas of democracy and the functioning of the state, the rule of law, fundamental rights, and public administration reform.
However, despite these commitments, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina remains very worrying and is far from meeting the political, economic, and social standards demanded by the EU. Furthermore, Milorad Dodik, president of Republika Srpska and ally of the Kremlin, has for years exercised enormous influence over the country’s Serbian entity and has often stoked ethnic tensions, the parliament repeatedly condemning his attempts at legislative projects. The European Commission has also criticized the country’s discriminatory constitution and failure to respect minority rights on five occasions. As for the problems of corruption in the country, the declared political commitment to fight corruption has not yet translated into concrete results. Finally, given its fragility in certain areas, Bosnia-Herzegovina is vulnerable to the influence of certain external players seeking to get involved in the region, such as Russia and China.
Hence, “It is hard to imagine BiH progressing far with an EU application unless it undertakes significant constitutional and institutional reforms soon” (Nielsen, 2020). These observations were made in 2020, and the country still seems to be stuck on the doorstep of the EU.
What Lies Ahead?
Evaluating Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress today, less than a year after gaining candidate status, is challenging, especially in the midst of a politically unstable environment. However, at the time of accession in December 2022, the Council did mention some progress: external relations, green agenda, modifications in public procurement law, appointment of judges to vacant seats, adoption of a counter-terrorism strategy, and better reception of migrants. Overall, progress has been limited, especially for the economic criteria, as the country needs further constitutional and electoral reforms to move forward. Lastly, October will be marked by the publication of the annual enlargement package, which, this year, will include an evaluation of Bosnia’s progress toward EU membership for the first time. While eventual membership still seems totally out of reach (Bilan du Monde, October 2022), the accession process is well underway.