In a historic shift of events, Sweden and Finland bid to apply as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an organisation established as a system of collective security for its members formed in the aftermath of World War II in 1949.
However, unlike other members, the two Nordic nations before, opted for neutrality and balance between the west and the east for over two centuries and refrained from joining in. Yet, in a desperate shift of events due to a Russian provocation in Ukraine in February 2022, the two countries have announced their willingness to join the organization. This one move is being seen as a watershed moment in the history of European solidarity.
How will the addition of Sweden and Finland create a change in Europe? This article will thus focus on and analyse the future impact of this move on the European Union, its autonomy, and solidarity.
Solidarity and the EU
According to the EU, the principle of solidarity enshrined in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), is explained;
“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights.”
However, the term “solidarity” lacks clarity inits definition of duties. Moreover, to ascertain the common security and defence policy of the EU, outlined in the 1992 Maastricht treaty that decrees member states to “commit and deploy resources for military or civilian missions for peace-keeping, conflict prevention, and crisis management….and influence policies violating international law or human rights, or policies disrespectful of the rule of law or democratic principles.” have had variable interpretations and were seen as theoretical pieces of legislation, unlike the other EU budget cases that have garnered a stricter stance.
Against this background, and given the current crises, a lack of dedicated EU military alliance and in the face of rising security threats, reveals that the foundation of the unions’ solidarity hasn’t had the opportunity to undergo a stress test and was merely a subject of loyalty. As a result of these external conditions, the clauses of European solidarity (Article 222 TFEU) and mutual assistance (Article 42 (7) TEU) have been highlighted, which explicitly imply that no member state is truly neutral once it has joined the EU and would act collectively in the event of an attack on a member state or in the face of a natural disaster. The clause also states that states must provide aid and assistance to those in need using all available means. This shall not prejudice to the security and defence policy of certain Member States in any specific character; thereof.
Whereas, the mutual assistance by members under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation makes it binding to be consistent with commitments and cooperate in collective defence and its implementation in a similar vein as enshrined under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
The formation of EU solidarity clauses and commitments, thus, comes across as in disharmony to each other and relatively weak compared to the ones under NATO.
The Ripple of Doubt and the Balance of Threat:
While the admission of Sweden and Finland to NATO, as well as their shifting neutrality stance, is cited as a strategic need and framed as an act of collective pursuit of strong European solidarity, some experts, however, cast their doubts on their inclusion into NATO, raising the theory of the Balance of Threat, which claims that states react to threats, not to power. (Bock, H., Why Balacing Fails, 2013, p. 1)
It is believed that, due to the open-endedness of the EU’s solidarity, the union risks losing its balance of power to the US military, its nuclear strength, and causing destabilisation in Europe. According to famous geopolitical theorist Stephen Walt’s theory of balance of threat (BoT), he argues that “states generally balance by allying against a perceived threat, and small nations tend to bandwagon more against threatful states to protect their own national security.” However, states will not balance against those that are rising in power but those that display offensive intentions. ” (Walt S., The Origins of Alliances, 1987, p. 32). Thus, explaining the reason for the lack of any serious presence of an anti-American alliance; globally and a modern risk to Europe’s autonomy with a chance of turning it into a quasi-NATO alliance. Euro-sceptics reiterate that, while the new non-neutral states have pledged to increase their military spending to bolster Europe’s defence calibre, it is worthwhile to note that, in the absence of a solidified basis of legislation on solidarity, the two nations would instead focus on defending their own territories, leverage their own influence over the Baltics, and exercise dominance over NATO’s policy discussions, thus, threatening the European Union’s political significance and exacerbating tensions within Europe.
The Eventualities:
From a legal standpoint, Sweden and Finland joining the league with NATO and its eventual impact on European solidarity resides on the ambiguity of mutual assistance and solidarity clause of Article 42(7) TEU, it isn’t flawed to believe that this ambiguity calls for three important eventualities,
- Conflict of national interests and defence versus sphere of influence for solidarity: While the legal standpoint supports solidarity among the Member States. The issue of national defence is a matter of national competence. Experts believe that Sweden and Finland are much superior economically compared to other European states. Thus, moving the pivot of influence of European strategic autonomy away towards further North and particularly toward the Artic and the Arctic council. Thus, heightening the tensions within the European Union and its alliance between states leaning towards strong transatlantic relationship versus those who seek to raise the prominence of the European Union as an autonomous security actor.
- Incompatibility between obligations to EUs solidarity versus commitments to NATO: While neutrality and non-alignment in military alliances under the mutual assistance clause, especially in case of Finland, Sweden, Austria and Ireland was to ensure the compatibility of EU’s policies with the NATO. However, much recently, in February 2022, the need for EU’s strategic autonomy, as stated by Emmanuel Macron under France’s presidency of the Council of European Union, states otherwise. This bid to apply for NATO’s membership Sweden and Finland have pointed towards a much formal security arrangement backed by American power. Thus, signalling greater faith in US backed defence guarantees that aren’t compatible tothe European Union’s collective military autonomy.
- Overlap of Organizational Structuring: The third element of complexity is institutional overlap between NATO and EU; a common phenomenon in global governance. While NATO clearly has greater institutional capacity, EU has larger scale of authority. On the other hand, NATO’s collective defence clause are far more binding than EU’s solidarity clause 222 and 42.7. Given this background, the admission of Sweden and Finland joining NATO creates a high probability for the two large market economies becoming formal bases to NATO forces leveraging the Baltics positions on NATO policies and isolating Russia; following the principle of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, that states “every country has the right to choose its security solution.” 1.This heightens the risk of disassociating with EU’s collective defence and greater alignment with position of United Kingdom, instead of France; overall an eventual threat to EU’s solidarity.
Going Forward
While Moscow may have miscalculated how Europe’s solidarity can be put to test where states instead of going their separate ways chose to balance the threatening behaviour as well as giving the Swedish and Finnish governments pending speculations on joining NATO; a headway. However, the solidarity clause between NATO and EU requires a keen legislative re-assessment from the viewpoint of calibre and commitment to mutual assistance, strategic regional autonomy and economic sovereignty. This development for Sweden and Finland will shift the pivot of EU’s extent of defence influence and its relationship with NATO. Thus, determining if non-alignment, neutrality and relationship for Sweden and Finland along with membership with the Union, is a workable and a long-term concept anymore.