Clouds are gathering – questions around the Hungarian presidency
The Hungarian EU Council presidency had to face criticism and several challenges that promised quite a bumpy ride ahead. At some points even stripping Hungary from the presidency was considered as an option by some, but as we pointed out in an earlier analysis, this was not a realistic idea.
One of the biggest problems was around concerns about democratic values, as domestic policies of Hungary, particularly during the 13 years of Viktor Orbán’s government, were badly criticized for undermining EU principles such as media freedom, judicial independence, and the rule of law. These concerns persisted long before (and also throughout) the presidency and led to serious scepticism from some (member states, institutions and political actors) about Hungary’s possible leadership in guiding European policies and capacity of acting as an “honest broker” in European matters.
Critics also highlighted that the general lack of transparency in Hungary’s operation may “infect” the presidency, especially in its decision-making processes, particularly concerning politically sensitive topics like migration (being a leading domestic political-communication issue) and the expansion of the Schengen system (with the presence of specific Hungarian interests on the matter).
The problem of specific partisan interests also raised issues. Hungary was also accused of using its presidency to advance its national interests rather than the collective interests of the community of the EU. It was never hard to find potential crossroads here: the constant emphasis of the Hungarian government on migration policies and border security was seen by many as simply doing domestic politics rather than fostering a balanced EU-wide approach, but with an EU-sheet in the background. Existing polarized reactions to migration policy promised nothing good but required a good mediator, and while Hungary’s recent constant push for stricter migration controls aligned with some member states, it alienated others – leading towards a mess instead of coordinated action. Critics argued that the Hungarian government’s approach could exacerbate divisions within the EU rather than promote unity, especially in an era when implementation and execution of the new EU migration laws should be made a priority by all.
Additionally, serious geopolitical challenges were ahead as well. The Hungarian Council presidency had to navigate an unusually complex geopolitical landscape, including ongoing tensions related to the Ukraine war and the crisis in the Middle East. The Hungarian government’s close ties with Russia and perceived reluctance to fully support Ukraine raised questions about its impartiality in representing EU interests, instead of its own – even if, in many cases, those were not easy to be seen or to be understood. The same concerns have been present in Viktor Orbán’s one-sided support of Israel as well, which, according to critics, have oversimplified the situation, thus not being compatible with the interests or expectations of some member states intending to apply a more sophisticated approach to the crisis.
Preparing for the storm – the goals and priorities
By setting the goals and priorities, the Hungarian government tried to make sure those set for the second half of 2024 are in alignment with recognised pressing EU-wide challenges and not only its national interests. Its key focus included further expansion of the Schengen area and help in further EU enlargement. Migration and border management was of course an important issue, and the 2025 annual budget was something to be dealt with. Energy, competitiveness and sustainability have also been recognised as major issues.
The expansion of the Schengen area practically meant the integration of Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen area (see an earlier analysis of ours on the subject). Hungary aimed to finalize agreements to end internal border controls for these countries, furthering EU cohesion and regional integration.
Concerning migration and border management we had more questions at the beginning than answers. The government of Hungary emphasized addressing illegal migration, strengthening external border controls, and reforming EU asylum policies, with the aims to enhance security and align migration policies with citizens’ expectations, but it was never clear, exactly what are the plans, especially shortly after finally concluding the long process of adoption of new laws on the subject (see our earlier analysis).
It is the job of the Council presidency to overlook the EU annual budget negotiations for the next year, where the priorities were to increase funding for cohesion policies, disaster relief, and Western Balkan enlargement preparations.
The latter was especially important: Hungary has already actively promoted the EU membership aspirations of Western Balkan countries, emphasizing their strategic importance and the need for faster accession processes. While some have seen this being more of an attempt of the Hungarian government to extend its local influence (and assist Russia’s geopolitical aims), this enlargement was in sync with the goals already identified by relevant European actors as well.
There was a lot of attention on energy security and competitiveness, especially because of the fact that during the past years, the Hungarian government – amid all the geopolitical tensions and the energy crisis – focused on trying to secure energy supplies differently than most of the other member states (again, raising serious debates sometimes), and it has done the same related to competitiveness. In the light of that, advancing discussions on a new European competitiveness pact to strengthen the economy of the EU seemed to be an interesting challenge.
Additionally, the presidency also emphasized the implementation of the European Green Deal, particularly in energy transition and environmental sustainability efforts, though this priority seemed to be secondary, compared to others, coming rather from the European Commission, and not solely from the Hungarian government.
Concluding the goals and priorities, they are the result of a balancing act by the Hungarian government between pressing EU challenges and its strategic national interests, including stricter control of migration and growth of regional influence.
Then a light rain – the results of the presidency
At the end, the Hungarian presidency of the Council of the European Union can be viewed as relatively successful, as it was able to achieve several of its planned goals, while outmanoeuvring potential conflicts, sometimes by simply postponing them.
The presidency and Hungary itself have played a key role in advancing the integration of Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen Area – a long-standing goal of Hungary which was already made clear during its previous presidency, in the first half of 2011. A final agreement to lift all internal border checks is probable to be reached during this December, the current presidency, marking a significant step in European integration.
Under the Hungarian presidency’s leadership, the EU budget for 2025 was also successfully finalized. According to the priorities, the budget emphasized increased funding for cohesion, disaster relief, and support for Western Balkan countries pursuing EU membership. This was not easily achieved among all economic and geopolitical challenges, which required the presidency to negotiate effectively and to strike a balance between concurring interests.
The presidency also focused on strengthening EU migration policies, hammering out agreements on border security and asylum procedures, trying to align with public demand and the Hungarian government’s own interest in stricter controls. These measures were part of many actors’ broader efforts to maintain a European unity on delicate issues like migration, but we have to note here that efforts by the Hungarian presidency have not been focused on developing or deepening already existing policies, or a better implementation of those, but rather keeping a delicate balance between direct and long-term political interests, which is not easy to achieve. These problems and open questions will surely not go away with the Hungarian presidency.
Additionally, the presidency did not fall into all the traps that are provided by an opportunity like this. While it had a tough start with Viktor Orbán’s strange and fruitless “peace mission” global travels, raising eyebrows and facing significant criticism, the presidency was not used – or abused – by the Hungarian government to try to influence or even obstruct procedures related to Hungary. There were concerns e.g. related to the ongoing Article 7 procedure being tinkered with by the presidency, but it did not happen – slowly silencing the initially very loud criticism, letting these issues go to the upcoming Polish presidency.
Overall, we can conclude that the Hungarian Council presidency prioritized practical solutions to complex challenges in all relevant fields: EU enlargement, budgetary stability, and migration policy reform. While it faced criticism (both before and during its term) over domestic political concerns, its ability to achieve consensus on high-profile issues (even if by de-politicizing them) was well acknowledged.