Europe once almost had a common army. But the establishment of NATO in 1949 and the failure of the European Defence Community of the Benelux, France, Italy and West Germany in 1954 has led to the European integration keeping the defence policy primarily on state level. However, an unforeseen act of war has disrupted the status quo: Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022 has raised some serious questions concerning the future of defence policy in the European Union. But are we really on the verge of a major transformation or is it just the mirage caused by the ongoing war?
A defence dilemma
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has cost the European Union not only money, but also a realisation: that spending more on defence will not solve the issue of cooperation. But truth to be told, the organisation did need some time to let that sink in. After Russia’s infamous attack, the European Union immediately adopted a package of sanctions and started to work on support measures to show solidarity with Ukraine. The defence side of it started with assistance measures under the European Peace Facility in July 2022 which aimed at supporting the capabilities and resilience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In October 2022, additional assistance measures were adopted for the same purpose, and a Military Assistance Mission was set up to enhance the military capability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In March 2024, a Ukrainian Assistance Fund was established to further support the country. As for now, the military aid amounts to €43 862 million.
In response to the high-intensity war, the European Union also approved a Strategic Compass along with its Member States in early 2022, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) during her State of the Union speech in 2023. The Strategic Compass was created to strengthen the security and defence policy of the organisation by 2030. Meanwhile the EDIS not only created a vision for the European defence industrial policy until 2035, but also proposed four actions to take, covering the already existing European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), the responsiveness of the European defence industry, the defence readiness culture and the European Union’s collaboration with international partners.
Despite all, spending more on European defence does not seem to translate into either improved capabilities or a deeper cooperation. The fragmentation in the field of defence is undeniable, as Member States take care of the defence planning and acquisition by themselves. The pursue of individual interests and the lack of trust between Member States make cooperation a real challenge. Even if the war had a positive effect on developing new defence tools on European level such as the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European Union is still far from joint defence planning and procurement, especially since planning tools in the area of European defence are not even binding. Talking about a European army in this context seems to be premature at best, and unrealistic at worst.
A new portfolio
On the 17th of September 2024, Ursula von der Leyen finally made the unprecedented, but not unanticipated announcement: she proposed a Commissioner for Defence and Space. Lithuanian Andrius Kubilius was born in 1956 and started his career as a Member of the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) in 1992. He became First Deputy Speaker of the Seimas in 1996. After the resignation of the President of Lithuania in 1999, Kubilis held the position for the two remaining years. He acted as Chairman of the Homeland Union party between 2003 and 2015, and Leader of the Opposition between 2005 and 2006, as well as between 2012 and 2016. In the meantime, Kubilis worked as Deputy Speaker of the Seimas from 2006, then became President once again in 2008, this time serving the entire term. He has been Member of the European Parliament in the Group of the European People’s Party since 2019, working as a Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy.
The biggest question here does not revolve around the person of Andrius Kubilius who seems to be a solid Commissioner-designate, but around the new portfolio itself. According to Kubilius, it will be this Commissioner’s responsibility to ensure that the European Union has the means to defend its Member States, however vague that may sound. It is also not clear yet, how much this position will take away from the High Representative’s competence. For example, if the new Defence Commissioner does not get the supervision over the European Defence Agency from the High Representative, they will risk gaining limited – and potentially even symbolic – rather than actual power. Although Kubilius seems to be determined to work on the European Union’s defence as he considers it one of the top priorities of the 2024-2029 cycle.
A delicate challenge
NATO being the most important defence alliance in the world, as well as the strategic partner of the European Union can make the change as difficult as it can make it easy. The partnership goes back to the EU-NATO declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy which set the basis of the cooperation on the 16th of December 2002. Since then, the EU-NATO relations have been deepened by tree Joint Declarations in 2016, 2018 and most recently 2023. The European Union also earned its unique place in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, as well as NATO in the European Union’s Strategic Compass. The complementary roles of the organisations have been underlined since the beginning of the partnership to avoid duplication and competition. Moving forward, taking into account outgoing NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s words, the European Union should still pay attention to this – in case the organisation intends to keep the good relations with NATO.
But the fate of the NATO-EU strategic partnership can also shift in a matter of seconds from another direction; during the announcement of the results of the upcoming United States presidential election on the 5th of November 2024. The European Union seems to already tremble from the possibility that Donald Trump may return as President. Based on Trump’s statements, the consequences might be lethal for Ukraine – potentially leaving the country at the mercy of Vladimir Putin – for NATO – possibly threatening to withdraw from the organisation to achieve his ends –, and along with that, for the European Union – damaging transatlantic relations with coercive measures. Although, of all countries, Ukraine seems to have some hope for Trump’s potential return concerning the end of the war. The situation is not estimated to be so louring in case Kamala Harris comes out on top, since she has repeatedly expressed her support for NATO and Ukraine. Harris’ presidency would definitely mean challenges for Europe too, but her views might give more reason for confidence than Trump’s.
All in all, even if there are only three months left of this year, the rest of 2024 will be decisive concerning the future of European defence, let it be due to the Defence Commissioner’s newly defined competence or the impeding United States presidential election, but hopefully not an escalation of Russia’s war in Ukraine.